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NOTE
FROM EVERSON TO DA VEY: THE ROAD IS LONG,
WITH MANY A WINDING TURN, THAT LEADS US
TO WHO KNOWS WHERE, WHO KNOWS WHEN*

A free government is a complicatedpiece of machinery, the nice and exact adjustment
of whose springs, wheels, and weights, is not yet well comprehended by the artists of
the age, and still less by the people.
John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, May 19, 1821.
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.",2 These sixteen words are usually referred to
as the "religion clauses" of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall declared in Marbury v. Madison3 that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." 4 This would, of course, include saying what the First Amendment means. But
in 1993, in response to what some considered the Court's suppression of religious
freedom in its First Amendment decisions, Congress attempted to circumvent the
Supreme Court's authority to interpret the First Amendment by passing, almost
unanimously, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.5 Unsurprisingly, the Court
ruled the Act unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.6 Relying on Marbury,
the Court reaffirmed that it was the final arbiter of First Amendment meaning.
The Supreme Court has continued to exercise the power to define what the
sixteen words of the First Amendment mean. Libraries could be filled with books
written about not only what the Supreme Court has decided those sixteen words
mean, but also what the Court should decide they mean. One would have a hard

* The Hollies, He Ain't Heavy, He's My Brother, in The Hollies Greatest Hits (Capitol/EMI
Records 2003) (CD).
1. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (May 19, 1821), in The Works of John Adams vol.
10, at 398 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1856).
2. U.S. Const. amend. I.
3. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. Id. at 177.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
6. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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time finding any other area of the law that is so "needlessly convoluted, elusive or
inherently conflicted.

7

In the first one hundred and fifty years of our Nation's history, very few
Religion Clause cases were decided 8 because the states were not subject to the
First Amendment. The text of the First Amendment expressly states that it
applies only to Congress. The federalism implications of the First Amendment,
combined with the reserved powers of the Tenth Amendment, required that
religious freedom issues be reserved to state jurisdiction.9 Most constitutional
commentators agree that "at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, it was
not the intention of the Framers to apply the Religion Clauses to the states."'
This issue of federalism was central to the original debate surrounding the drafting
of the Bill of Rights, particularly the First Amendment." States wanted assurance
that they would not have to give up their right of sovereignty over issues of
religion. At a time when suspicion of a strong central government was high, states
were not interested in delegating this important area to the national government.
By contrast, in the past fifty years the Supreme Court has been overwhelmed
with First Amendment litigation.12 Reading majority and dissenting opinions in
First Amendment cases might lead one to believe that the various justices were
reading two different Constitutions. Even within their own opinions the justices
lament the lack of coherence in this area." Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority in a recent case, sympathized with the Fifth Circuit's inability to make
heads or tails of conflicting precedent 4 The turning point was the 1947 decision
of Everson v. Board of Education." In a decision that required equal access to
transportation for students who attended religious schools, Justice Hugo Black,

writing for the majority, stated: "The First Amendment, as made applicable to the
7. Andrew A. Beerworth, Religion in the Marketplace: Establishments, Pluralisms, and the
DoctrinalEclipse of Free Exercise, 26 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev. 333, 333 (2004).
8. James J. Knicely, "First Principles" and the Misplacement of the "Wall of Separation": Too Late
in the Day for a Cure? 52 Drake L. Rev. 171, 173 (2004). The title of Knicely's article refers to a
remark by Justice William Brennan suggesting that even if it was determined that the writers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had no intention to apply the First Amendment to the states, it is too late in
the day now to do anything to reverse what has been done. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 257 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
9. See John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion, 32 Cap. U. L. Rev 499,
506 (2004).
10. Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism,Fundamental Fairness,and the Religion Clauses, 25 Cumb. L. Rev.
247, 250 (1995).
11. See id. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale
L.J. 1193 (1992).
12. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 279, 287 (2001).
13. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's
"consistent unpredictability").
14. In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 806 (2000), Justice Thomas wrote:
The Fifth Circuit thus faced a dilemma between, on the one hand, the Ninth Circuit's
holding and analysis in Walker and our subsequent decisions in Rosenberger and Agostini,
and, on the other hand, our holdings in Meek and Wolman. To resolve the dilemma, the
Fifth Circuit abandoned any effort to find coherence in our case law or to divine the future
course of our decisions and instead focused on our particular holdings.
15. 330 U.S. 1.
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respecting an
states by the Fourteenth, commands that a state 'shall make no law
16
thereof.'
exercise
free
the
prohibiting
or
religion,
establishment of
With this decision the Supreme Court began a journey that would change the
direction of First Amendment jurisprudence and the relationship of religion and
government, at state as well as national levels. 7 Although the Court had already
made the Free Exercise Clause applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment nearly ten years earlier in Cantwell v. Connecticut,'8 now Everson
incorporated the Establishment Clause to the states as well.
Not only did Everson incorporate the Establishment Clause to the states, but
it also interpreted the Clause to require total separation of church and state. Most
of the confusion in the First Amendment decisions of the past fifty years is a result
of the complications involved in applying Everson's requirement of incorporation
together with its requirement of total separation of church and state.' 9 Here, 20a
legal fiction is arguably required in order to apply these principles to the states.
In applying this legal fiction, the Court "turned upside down 2 1 the jurisdictional
roles that the First Amendment had defined in matters of religion.
As Everson's legitimacy, and that of the line of cases attempting to apply it,
continues to be questioned and debated, it becomes more and more obvious that
Everson's legacy has become the "elephant in the room ' 2 that has made First
Amendment jurisprudence unmanageable. The questions raised by Everson "go
to the very nature of our Constitution. 2 3 Some scholars have gone so far as to
compare the importance of incorporation of previously "unabsorbed" clauses, as
was done in Everson, to Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury, while others have
proclaimed it more far reaching than desegregation cases.24
It is the contention of this note that since Everson, the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence has been a tortuous, winding path of contradictory
decisions that could have been corrected with the 2004 case of Locke v. Davey.25
In that case, the Court decided that the state of Washington did not violate Joshua
Davey's constitutional rights when it revoked Davey's Promise Scholarship award
solely because he chose to major in theology. The facts in Davey presented the
Court with an opportunity to straighten its path by declaring that where state laws
undermine the federal rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, states should not be allowed to "define their own contradictory

16. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
17. Knicely, supra n. 8, at 172.
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses peaceably trying to spread
their faith on a public street was a violation of their First Amendment rights).
19. Poppel, supra n. 10, at 248.
20. See id. at 248-49.
21. Id. at 249.
22. Knicely, supra n. 8, at 176.
23. Amar, supra n. 11, at 1194 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure,53 Cal. L. Rev. 929, 934 (1965)).
24. Id. at 1195-96.

25. 540 U.S. 712.
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standards. 2 6 The terms of the Promise Scholarship and the Washington
Constitution's establishment clause should have been ruled unconstitutional for
their facial discrimination against a religious practice. The most recent U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, current public policy, and the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution required such a holding. However, the Court failed to protect
Davey's religious freedom, bringing even further confusion to its First
Amendment jurisprudence, and further removing the First Amendment from
religious liberty.
Part Two of this note will contend that two errors in Everson have been at
the heart of most of the confusion and inconsistency in First Amendment
jurisprudence. The first mistake was the Court's treatment of the religion clause
of the First Amendment as if it protected two separate interests. The second error
was its arbitrary construction of the First Amendment Religion Clause to demand
total separation of church and state. Had Everson simply incorporated the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses to the states, it might have been successful at
developing a fair and consistent First Amendment jurisprudence.
Adding
Everson's requirement of complete separation made those goals difficult if not
impossible to attain.
Part Three will discuss how the Rehnquist Court has moved away from
Everson's demand for strict separation. The Court has developed sufficient
precedent that Davey could have been a landmark case resulting in a more fair,
consistent, and coherent First Amendment jurisprudence. However, the Court's
recent, more relaxed view of the relationship between church and state has
resulted in some states beginning to rely on their own constitutions in decisions
regarding religion, as Washington did in Davey. Many of these state constitutions
contain establishment clauses that are stricter than the U.S. Constitution's
Establishment Clause.
Part Four reviews Davey and argues that allowing states to use their own
establishment clause provisions to circumvent the Supreme Court's First
Amendment analysis and holdings creates even more confusion in an already
confused First Amendment jurisprudence. Davey would have been the ideal
vehicle for the Court to define more adequately the relationship between
federalism and incorporation and to focus on maximizing religious liberty.
Part Five analyzes the Court's limited rationale in Davey, arguing that the
decision, unless very narrowly construed, leaves First Amendment jurisprudence
even worse off than it was before.
II.

EVERSON: THE JOURNEY BEGINS

Around the turn of the twentieth-century the Supreme Court began to apply,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, certain provisions of the Bill of Rights to the
states on the same basis that it applied those provisions to the federal

26. Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair,Witters, and the Protectionof Religious Freedom,
27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 299, 301 (2003).
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government. 21 In Everson, the Court declared that the Establishment Clause was
incorporated to the states just as fully as to the national government. After
declaring incorporation, Justice Black continued with words that would forever
leave their mark:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another .... No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
28
Church and State."
The Court made two key mistakes in this pronouncement. First, it divorced
the Religion Clause into two halves, treating it as if it protected two distinct
interests in tension with one another. Second, it proclaimed the Establishment
Clause's purpose to be separation of church and state instead of religious
freedom.2 9 These two mistaken concepts were now to be applied to the states. By
requiring states to enforce separation of church and state, the federal government
made a law respecting an establishment of religion-the very thing the First
Amendment expressly forbids it to do. Consequently, Everson's decision and its
rationale "forced a square historical peg into a round doctrinal hole by filing off a
30
few of the more inconvenient sharp edges of history.
A.

Mistake One: The Religion Clause Gets a Divorce

The Everson pronouncement above states an Establishment Clause funding
principle: there is to be no government funding to support religion in any way. 31
The decision also contains a free exercise nondiscrimination principle: the state
cannot discriminate against any persons in a religious group by preventing them,
"because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation., 32 The former principle is based on a "secularist world view and
requires complete separation of church and state"; 33 the latter is based on a "more

27. Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court: The Cases That Define the Debateover Church and State
1 (Terry Eastland ed., Ethics & Pub. Policy Ctr. 1993) [hereinafter Religious Liberty].
28. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
29. Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 293, 298304 (2002).
30. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment ClauseAdjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 317-18 (1986).
31. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 163 (2004).
32. Id. (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16) (emphasis omitted).
33. Viteritti, supra n. 26, at 325.
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pluralistic/egalitarian world view and calls for neutrality." 34 Everson straddles the
fence: it is historically known for upholding strict separation, but its ruling
ironically allowed government funding of transportation to a religious school.
Everson's presupposition that the purpose of the Establishment Clause is
separate from, and in tension with, the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is a
root cause of much of the incoherence in the Court's Religion Clause decisions.35
To focus primarily on the Establishment Clause "emphasiz[es] separation ...at
the expense of 'neutrality,' ' , 36 when it "makes little textual or historical sense to
read the two clauses as conflicting" 37 to begin with. The two halves of the Religion
Clause "should be considered together and understood as advancing
fundamentally similar interests., 38 Yet the view that the Religion Clause can be
divided into two distinct parts is so common that it is startling to consider
otherwise.
The idea that there are natural structural tensions between the two halves of
the Religion Clause-that they are not two sides of one coin3_-immediately
creates tension between them. When each clause is seen as having its own interest
to protect, those interests become inherently mutually exclusive.
The
Establishment Clause can be construed as somewhat negative toward religion,
mandating a form of government discrimination, while the Free Exercise Clause
demands all religion be treated favorably.4n
If this is the case, then "the
Establishment Clause forbids the very type of accommodative commingling of
government and religion that the Free Exercise Clause makes obligatory. '41 If
viewed in this light it might seem that either of the two religion clauses, "if
42
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.,
The obvious potential for mischief in putting the Religion Clauses in tension
is that one side is favored at the other's expense. Stephen Carter, professor of law
at Yale, and a specialist on religion and the law, points out that there is, after all,43
only one occurrence of the word "religion" in the First Amendment, not two.
Yet the Court has defined the single occurrence of the word "religion" differently
depending on which half of the Religion Clause is under examination. 44 When the
free exercise half is under scrutiny, the Court gives "religion" a very broad

34. Id.
35. Paulsen, supra n. 30, at 313-15.
36. Id. at 323.
37. Id. at 324.
3M Id. at 315 (emphasis omitted).
39. Id. at 313 ("It is time to reject the widely-accepted premise that the establishment and free
exercise clauses are in 'tension' with each other and affirm instead that the two clauses are but two
sides of the same coin, a coin which represents a single 'value' in our constitutional democracyreligious freedom.").
40. Beerworth, supra n. 7, at 334-35.
41. Id. at 335.
42. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (holding that tax exemptions given for
property of religious organizations used solely for religious purposes do not violate the First
Amendment).
43. Carter, supra n. 29, at 298-99.
44. Id. at 299.
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meaning: it includes any and all beliefs and non-beliefs, even protecting atheism. 5
Yet when the word "religion" is used in the establishment half, the Court does not
define it as including atheism or secularism, but almost exclusively applies it to
Christianity.46 It is apparent that when interpreted in this way, division of the two
halves of the Religion Clause produces results that favor non-religion over
religion.
This result cannot possibly promote the Founders' chief aim of
guaranteeing religious freedom. Carter argues that:
In our enthusiasm for the anti-establishment side of the separation of church
and state-the side that neither has nor can have any coherent doctrine behind itwe tend to neglect the pro-religious liberty side, the real concern of the pioneers of
the metaphor. I think that is probably why we guard free exercise so poorly. We
choose to place the energy of radical judicial intervention on the side of limiting
government speech [as in posting the Ten Commandments]; whereas the greatest
threats to liberty lie not in the government's speech but in its action [as in not
allowing a grade school student to read his favorite story to the class because it is
from the Bible].47
Carter also contends "the stumbling block, in nearly every case, is... the fruitless
effort to pour content
into the 'free exercise clause' without violating the
'establishment clause.' '48
The First Amendment Religion Clause has one purpose: the protection of
religious liberty. When it is construed to protect two separate interests that are at
odds with each other, religious liberty is endangered. Everson and its progeny
should not have divorced the Religion Clause halves. Doing so led Everson to its
second and even more problematic mistake.
B.

Mistake Two: Total Separation

The second mistake that Everson made was the declaration that the
preeminent purpose of the Religion Clause is total separation of church and state.
Since Everson, the phrase "wall of separation between church and state" has
become so synonymous with the First Amendment that perhaps a majority of
Americans believe it is actually part of the Constitution.4 9 But it actually

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 308-09.
48. Carter, supra n. 29, at 307.
49. See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 1-6 (Harv. U. Press 2002). Hamburger
points out that the idea of separation of church and state as envisioned by Jefferson and revitalized by
Justice Black in Everson has become something of a myth. Id. at 3. He suggests that the concept is so
deeply embedded in the public consciousness, because of repetition, that it is almost impossible to
erase. Id. at 8. He gives examples of authors trying to shake off the implications of the phrase and yet
continuing to define their views in its terms rather than invest in new coinage, and concludes that:
These commentators who attempt to wiggle free from the clear implications of Jefferson's
phrase make no effort to shake off the phrase itself and thereby reveal how much it has
become part of American culture and constitutional thought. Although some have rejected
the phrase as ahistorical, most judges, lawyers, academics, journalists, and other
Americans-even those who reject its implications-repeatedly talk about religious liberty
and especially that of the First Amendment in terms of a "separation of church and state."
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originated in a letter written by Jefferson in 1802 to the Danbury Baptist
Association."
Because of the weight and effect of Everson's landmark
pronouncement, Justice Black effectively "penned [Jefferson's] metaphor into the
First Amendment.", 51 Of course, Jefferson was a giant among the founders of the
nation. 5 2
republic. His ideas, writings, and views in many ways have "shaped the
But Jefferson was in France at the time the Bill of Rights was written, and was not
even involved in the debates. 53 Not only was he not involved in the writing of the
First Amendment, his views were not the predominant views of the American
people or the Drafters of the Bill of Rights.54 Some have argued that if Jefferson
"wished to promote a peaceable, rational religion that minds its own business, is
tolerant of others, and does not meddle in affairs of state, [his] aspirations were
diametrically opposed to those whose political efforts produced the first
amendment."55 Professor Carter remarked that the "notion that the Founding
Generation was particularly afraid of the influence of religion over the state is
nonsense-pardonable nonsense, but nonsense all the same. It does not stand up
well to the evidence., 56 It has been suggested that rather than truly relying on
Jefferson's views on the First Amendment, the justices in Everson used his phrase
as a pretext for imposing their own personal views on issues of church and state."
Using Jefferson's metaphor "seemed obvious, natural, and clear to them because
it fit so readily what they expected the Constitution to say.",58 It would seem then,
that a seven-word phrase written by Jefferson in a letter, more than two decades
after the Bill of Rights was drafted, is a dubious source to rely on to definitively
outline which rights the Drafters intended the First Amendment to protect.

Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 1. Jefferson quoted the First Amendment and gave his own twist to it, saying:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that theirlegislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church &
State.
Hamburger, supra n. 49, at 1 (emphasis in original).
51. Beerworth, supra n. 7, at 340.
52. Id. at 1.
53. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. See Witte, supra n. 9, at 500 (suggesting that recent research shows Jefferson's views were not
the "conventional views in his own day-or in the century to follow"). See also Knicely, supra n. 8, at
199 (contending that the "separation Jefferson endorsed was contrary to [the separation] the Baptists
and other dissenters sought... and has been incompatible with the lives of many Americans").
55. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1446 (1990).
56. Carter, supra n. 29, at 297. For a critique of Carter's book The Culture of Disbelief,see Kenneth
R. Craycraft, Jr., The American Myth of Religious Freedom 156-164 (Spence Publg. 1999).
57. Jeffries & Ryan, supra n. 12, at 219.
58. Id.
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A Page of History is Worth a Volume of Logic59

To arrive at its faulty interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the
Everson Court "imagined a past to confirm that interpretation." 60 More recent
scholarship, particularly that by Philip Hamburger, has shown that Everson's
history recital was inaccurate and misleading at best.61 Everson portrayed the
primary intent of the First Amendment to be total separation of the church from
the state. Even a cursory review of American history and the history of the First
Amendment, however, shows that Everson got it wrong: separation of church and
state was not preeminent in the minds of the men who wrote the First
Amendment. 62 The Court based its historical analysis in Everson on Jefferson's
and Madison's views relating to religious freedom in Virginia.63 It thus "treated
the history of the United States as if it were the history of Virginia." 64 Trying to
extrapolate these men's views on religious issues for Virginia, and applying them
to the writers of the First Amendment, is not adequate for determining what
interest the First Amendment was designed to protect. Everson's view of
separation of church and state is not an accurate reflection of the prevailing
American vision of religion at the time of the Founding.65 There was very little
sympathy at the time the Bill of Rights was penned for the view that religion could
be severed totally from interaction or even favor with the gqvernment. 66
The original intent of the First Amendment can best be determined by
attempting "to see [it] through the eyes of [its] proponents, most of whom were
members of the most fervent and evangelical denominations in the nation., 67 At
the time of the Revolution and subsequent Constitutional Convention, the nation
had just come through the Great Awakening, resulting in a pervasively religious
culture. 68 The American people presupposed that the government would by
nature be religious and would encourage religion.69 Complete separation was

59. This is an often-quoted phrase of Justice Holmes from N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,
349 (1921).
60. Jeffries & Ryan, supra n. 12, at 285-86.
61. See generally Hamburger, supra n. 49. See also Knicely, supra n. 8, at 198-99.
62. See Paulsen, supra n. 30, at 314 ("The Supreme Court's reading of the religion clauses is
completely indefensible-historically, textually, and practically.").
63. 330 U.S. at 11-13. Everson is full of history from beginning to end.
64. Jeffries & Ryan, supra n. 12, at 286.
65. See generally Hamburger, supra n. 49.
66. Gabriel A. Moens, The Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 535, 538.
67. McConnell, supra n. 55, at 1437.
68. William H. Marnell, The First Amendment: The History of Religious Freedom in America 93-104
(Doubleday & Co. 1964). See also Lib. Cong., Religion and the Founding of the American Republic,
Religion in Eighteenth-Century America, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel02.html (Oct. 27, 2003).
69. Moens, supra n. 66, at 538. The author makes the point that:
[The Founders] knew that religion could not be separated from decision makers' thought
processes.
In incorporating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses into the
Constitution, the drafters did not intend to trivialize the role that religion played in the
United States; rather, they sought to prevent the establishment of a state-sponsored church.
Following the understanding of separation between church and state at that time, the
Founders aimed to protect religion from the state, not the state from religion, as the
Supreme Court has recently held.
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thought by the people and their leaders to be not only impossible, but also
imprudent." At the time of the Constitutional Convention, at least six of the
thirteen states allowed some form of government support to churches; several
state constitutions limited the protection of religious freedom.7 Most states
S72
required religious tests for those who desired to run for public office.
Consequently, at the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, no state,
except possibly Rhode Island, "could have been... in compliance with the
modern understanding of separation of church and state., 73 The consensus of the
nation was that religion was not only a good thing, but it was indispensable to
freedom and democracy.74
Madison's first draft of the Religion Clause, the proposed amendments to it,
and the debates the draft and amendments precipitated, are instructive in
determining what rights and concerns were preeminent in the mind of the
Framers. The first draft, which could itself be considered the annotated or
amplified version of the final amendment, read:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext infringed. 75
The proposed changes that were then suggested, and the discussions that followed
each new proposal, indicate that one fear among the Framers was that they would
produce a document that would "be taken in such latitude as to be extremely

Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. McConnell, supra n. 55, at 1441 ("The central preoccupation of republican political theory was
the necessity of public 'virtue.' In its religious manifestation, this meant that government should
support and encourage religion in order to promote public morality.").
George Washington in his Farewell Address stated:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality
are indispensable supports.... And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality
can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined
education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect
that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents vol. 1, at 205, 212 (Bureau of Nat].
Literature 1897).
71. Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity under
ConstitutionalFederalism,15 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 113, 119 (1996).
72. Id.
73. Jeffries & Ryan, supra n. 12, at 292.
74. See generally McConnell, supra n. 55.
75. The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins 1 (Neil H. Cogan ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1997). About a month after the original draft was submitted the Congressional
Register records that:
Mr. Madison [t]hought, if the word national was inserted before religion, it would satisfy
the minds of honorable gentlemen. He believed the people feared one sect might obtain a
pre-eminence, or two combine together and establish a religion to which they would compel
others to conform; he thought if the word national was introduced, it would point the
amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent.
Id. at2.
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hurtful to the cause of religion., 7 6 Almost two hundred years later, their fears
were realized in Everson.
The pronouncements of Supreme Court justices in the early years of the
republic provide further evidence that, at the very least, the Founders did not
envision a complete separation. Justice Samuel Chase, appointed to the Supreme
and a signer of the Declaration of Independence,
Court by George Washington,
77
said in Runkel v. Winemiller:
Religion is of general and public concern, and on its support depend, in great
measure, the peace and good order of government, the safety and happiness of the
people. By our form of government, the Christian religion is the established
same
religion; and all sects and denominations of christians are placed upon the
78
equal footing, and are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty.
Everson relied heavily on historical analysis to arrive at its conclusions.
80
79
Subsequent Supreme Court historical analysis and recent historical scholarship
concerning the First Amendment do not bear out Everson's declaration that the
goal of the First Amendment was to erect a high wall between religion and
government. Everson's application of Jefferson's wall metaphor to the First
Amendment has, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, and as will be seen, proven
"all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication."8'

III. EVERSON's LEGACY AND THE REHNQUIST COURT'S
Focus ON NEUTRALITY

With the application of the First Amendment to the states came increased
litigation.82 Religion Clause suits either claim that an establishment of religion has
been made by the government, or, less often, that the free exercise of religion has
been burdened by the government. 83 The free exercise cases fall into two
categories: accommodation and discrimination.
A.

Free Exercise Accommodation Cases

The first type of free exercise claim involves a plaintiff asking for an
exemption from a generally applicable law.84 The Court has woven an irregular
piece of cloth, generally described as accommodation, from these decisions. In

76. Id. at 60.
77. 1799 WL 422 (Md. Gen. 1799).

78. Id. at *14.
79. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. See generally Hamburger, supra n. 49; see also Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the
Wall of SeparationBetween Church and State (N.Y.U. Press 2002).
81. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Wallace held that a state law that allowed a
moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" in public schools violated the First
Amendment when the sole express reason for the law was to return voluntary prayer to the public
schools. Id. at 40 n. 2.
82. Jeffries & Ryan, supra n. 12, at 287.
83. See generally Religious Liberty, supra n. 27.
84. McConnell, supra n. 55, at 1416-18.
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Reynolds v. United States,85 the only Religion Clause case of importance before the
two halves were incorporated,"6 the Court seemed to rule out the possibility of
exempting religious believers from generally applicable laws when the issue is a
conflict between those laws and an individual's religious beliefs. In this 1879
bigamy case, based on federal anti-bigamy laws, the Court made a distinction
between beliefs and actions.87 Its decision indicated that, though beliefs are
protected by the First Amendment, actions that are contrary to a generally
applicable law are not. Individuals could hold beliefs without interference, they
just could not practice them if they were illegal. It is difficult to see how this could
have been the Framer's intent. If only beliefs were at issue, there would have
been no need for the First Amendment to concern itself with free exercise of those
beliefs-for who can control someone else's beliefs?
In 1963, the Court seemed to switch directions with its decision in Sherbert v.
Verner.88 Adell Sherbert was a Seventh Day Adventist who lost her job because
she would not work on Saturday, her Sabbath. 89 When she applied for
unemployment benefits, the state said she was disqualified because she refused to
work. 9° The Court found the state's decision to deny Sherbert benefits
unconstitutional. 91 In contrast to Reynolds, Sherbert stood for the proposition that
any law that burdened conduct that was religiously motivated was unconstitutional
unless it protected a compelling state interest, and did so with the least intrusive
means possible. 92 Other cases that followed supported this proposition. One such
case was Wisconsin v. Yoder,93 where the Court ruled that a state could not require
students to attend school until they were sixteen, in violation of their religious
beliefs.94 These were generally applicable laws that had the effect of burdening
certain religious beliefs. 95 But in Employment Division v. Smith,96 the Court went
back to the position it held in Reynolds. While purporting to simply distinguish
Smith from Sherbert, for all practical purposes it overruled the Sherbert line of
cases. 97 In Smith, the Court held that an Oregon state law making the ingestion of
peyote a felony was not a law that the plaintiff could be exempted from on
98
grounds, even when the peyote was used only for ceremonial purposes.
religious
The Court has thus gone back and forth, trying to find the proper balance between

85. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
86. Religious Liberty, supra n. 27, at 1.
87. Beerworth, supra n. 7, at 337-38.
88. 374 U.S. 398.
89. Id. at 399.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 410.
92. Religious Liberty, supra n. 27, at 6.
93. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
94. Id. at 207.
95. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to
FormalNeutrality and an Uncertain Future,75 Ind. L.J. 1, 11 (2000).
96. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
97. Conkle, supra n. 95, at 11-12.
98. 494 U.S. at 890.
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allowing religious freedom to flourish, and yet not allowing everyone to become
"a law unto [themselves]." 99
B.

Free Exercise DiscriminationCases

The second type of cases brought under the Free Exercise Clause includes
those involving the government singling out religion for discrimination. The
decision in Everson, while decreeing the no-funding principle alongside the
nondiscrimination principle, came down on the side of nondiscrimination,
allowing funding for transportation to private sectarian schools.'
However, in
the early post-Everson decisions, the courts often seemed more concerned about
the interests of non-believers than the interests of those the Amendment was
actually intended to protect.10 1 One writer has suggested this is analogous to
"fashioning freedom of the press around the needs of the illiterate, or orienting
free speech to the preferences of the quiet, or the right to assembly around the
dispositions of hermits. ' 2
In recent years, however, the Rehnquist Court has required at least facial
neutrality toward religion.
In McDaniel v. Paty, °3 the Court ruled that
disqualification from public office because of membership in the clergy was an
unconstitutional discrimination against religion.
The Court's strongest
articulation of its nondiscrimination doctrine was in its 1993 decision of Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.' 4 In this case the Court struck
down a law that the Hialeah city council passed in an emergency session that
would punish "[w]hoever... unnecessarily or cruelly... kills any animal."' ' The
Court found that the law, which was interpreted to include killing for religious
sacrifices, targeted the Santeria religion, which planned to build a church in
Hialeah. 1 6 The Court, continuing its trend requiring neutrality, said that "the
minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A
law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernible from the language or context."'0 7 The Lukumi Court seemed
to draw an unambiguous line in the sand, putting states on notice: religious
discrimination will not stand.
C.

The Establishment Clause Cases: Building the Wall

In applying the Establishment Clause to the states, post-Everson, the
Supreme Court has produced a series of decisions that are conflicting and

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
330 U.S. at 17-18.
Viteritti, supra n. 26, at 334-35.
Id. at 335.
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
508 U.S. 520.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 533.
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unworkable. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,'°8 a case disallowing a state to provide salary
supplements or materials for religious schools, the Court said that in order to pass
constitutional muster, a statute or regulation must: (1) have a legislative purpose
that is secular; (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) not excessively
entangle the government with religion. °9 The history of the so-called Lemon test
is not pretty. The Court has struggled to make sense of it, modified it, ignored it,
used part of it, but never actually overturned it." ° Justice Scalia has remarked
that, like a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys.""' One author has summarized the Supreme Court's use of the
Lemon test in First Amendment jurisprudence in the 1970s and 1980s as "so
incoherent that at times [it] seemed to be acting arbitrarily.""12 The author just
quoted amasses an amazing list of conflicting decisions dealing with the issue of
funding:
In one case [the Supreme Court] disallowed a program that reimbursed
parochial schools for the administrative costs incurred for teacher-prepared
achievement tests in compulsory subjects; in another it approved reimbursements of
similar costs for standardized tests. It prohibited state funding for staff and
materials in auxiliary services such as counseling, guidance, and speech, but
permitted aid for diagnostic speech, hearing, and psychological testing. It ruled that
while textbook loans are a legitimate benefit to parents and their children, loaning
instructional equipment had "the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing
religion."

Although states were allowed to offer students transportation to

parochial schools, the states were not permitted to give the same students a ride to a
public park or museum. The Court also ruled that public school teachers could not
provide government-supported remedial services to disadvantaged children on the
premises of their religious schools. The latter decision burdened parochial school
children by requiring them to leave the comfort of their own schools to receive

108. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
109. Id. at 612-13.
110. Moens, supra n. 66, at 540-55.
111. Lamb's Chapel v. Cir. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (concurring).

The entire quote reads:
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening
the little children and school attorneys .... Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be
sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee v. Weisman conspicuously avoided using
the supposed "test" but also declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however,
no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally
driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly), and a
sixth has joined an opinion doing so.
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to
scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the
tomb at will. Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a

somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.
Id. at 398-99 (citations omitted).
112. Viteritti, supra n. 26, at 329.
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much-needed remedial services that the court and most government officials agreed
they were entitled to receive and forced public schools to build or rent temporary
services that otherwise could have been delivered
structures for the provision of11the
3
in the children's home schools.
As a whole, these Establishment Clause cases represent only one area of
First Amendment jurisprudence. They expose the inconsistency that has resulted
from the Court's attempt to balance the demands of free exercise, total separation
Everson's wall was proving
of church and state, and judicial federalism.
unworkable.
D.

The Wall Begins to Crumble

In the 1980s there began to be cracks in the high wall of separation, as the
Rehnquist Court began to gradually demand government neutrality toward
religion. 114 In a close decision in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty,"' the court upheld a New York law that allowed state funds to
flow to private and parochial schools for certain administrative tasks. Then in the
1983 landmark decision of Mueller v. Allen, 16 the Court upheld a Minnesota law
providing that parents could claim a tax deduction for school expenses, including
tuition, regardless of where their child went to school. This case distinguished
between direct and indirect aid to religion based on parental choice.117
Since Mueller, the Court has held in a series of cases that government funds
may reach religious institutions without offending the Establishment Clause when
the funds are dispersed on a neutral basis for a secular purpose and the decision to
use the money at a religious establishment is a function of personal choice.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,"8 Mitchell v. Helms," 9 Agostini v. Felton,20 Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District,'2 ' Bowen v. Kendrick,122 and Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind,1 3 are all funding cases standing
for the proposition that there is no violation of the Establishment Clause when
private choice breaks the link between the government and the religious
establishment.
The Court also began chipping away the wall with regard to cases dealing
with free speech and equal access. In Board of Education of Westside Community

113. Id. at 329-30 (footnotes omitted).
114. Viteritti, supra n. 71, at 135.

115. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
116. 463 U.S. 388.
117. Viteritti, supra n. 71, at 136.

118.
119.
120.
121.

536 U.S.
530 U.S.
521 U.S.
509 U.S.

639 (2002).
793 (2000).
203 (1997).
1 (1993).

122. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). This case is different from the previous cases. Those cases are all dealing
with religious schools. This case upheld on its face federal funding of church-affiliated counseling
centers promoting chastity. Id.

123. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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Schools v. Mergens,124 the Court ruled that the Equal Access Act was
constitutional in requiring that "public schools must permit student religious clubs
125
organizations.,
to meet on campus under the same terms as other non-curricular
The Court noted that "if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open
to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward
religion.' ' 126 Mergens was followed by Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District127 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia. 28 In each case the Court disallowed discrimination based on religious
beliefs.
The Rehnquist Court's neutrality doctrine seemed to dispel the notion that
religious people and religious organizations are a threat to society. Although still
not always consistent, nor always coherent, the Rehnquist Court was beginning to
move away from the Everson view that the Religion Clause promises protection
9
from religion, and back to the view that it promises protection of religion.
Under the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, we find that "religious organizations
as
[as they had been historically] are [once again] viewed more positively
culture.' 130
institutions that are valued for their contribution to the civic
E.

States Have an Ace In the Hole: Their Own Constitutions

After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court did not rush to
apply individual rights of the Constitution to the states.'3 What rights were to be
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and to what extent they
were to apply, has been a source of debate in and of itself. 32 For the most part,
the rule commonly used was that those parts of the Bill of Rights that were
selected for incorporation were those "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' ' 33 In the long run, most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights have been
incorporated to the states1 34
The Court has never explicitly spelled out how incorporation affects the
federalism aspects of the First Amendment. What limits does incorporation now
put on the states? If the First Amendment incorporates to the states those rights
that have to do with "ordered liberty,"' 35 then it would seem logical that the
primary aim of First Amendment is to protect individual religious liberties. If the
'' 136
incorporation of
Supreme Court demands what has been called a "jot for jot
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

496 U.S. 226 (1990).
Viteritti, supra n. 71, at 138-39.
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Viteritti, supra n. 71, at 140.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 144.
See generally Amar, supra n. 11.
Poppel, supra n. 10, at 272.
Id.
Id. at 272-73.
See id. at 274-281 (discussing the concept of "jot for jot" incorporation).
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137
First Amendment rights, it would stand to reason under the Supremacy Clause
that the states would have to conform their religious liberty decisions to the
analytical reasoning of Supreme Court religious liberty and establishment cases.
After Mueller, Mergens, and Lukumi, it seems likely that the Court, according to
its "emerging pluralist philosophy,' ' 139 should be "vigilant in assuring that practice
based on such convictions is not unduly burdened by a government-imposed
secularism. ' ' 40
However, while the Court has held that religious organizations may be the
indirect recipients of government funding where choice breaks the connection
between the state and religion, not all state courts have gone along with this
view. 141 Many have indicated that they do not believe that the Court's analysis,
particularly with regard to funding cases, is binding on how they interpret their
own constitutions.142 This awakened vitality for federalism in the area of religion
has resulted in wildly "conflicting interpretations of religious freedom" from state
to state that have been allowed by the Court and are overripe for "remedy by the
federal government., 143 A renewed dependence on state constitutions to decide
establishment clause issues changes the focus of the debate. 144 The dilemma now
returns to the problem that Everson thrust upon the Court: how to apply
federalism after incorporation. What boundaries in this "field of discretion"'145 do
the states have? Are they free to contradict the Establishment Clause reasoning
implicate free exercise issues? 146 "Where
of the Court when the contradictions
147
and how does one draw the line?'
In Witters, the Court hinted that it would allow the states broad latitude in
deciding religious discrimination issues on the basis of state constitutions. 148 In
Witters, a blind student desired to use his state vocational rehabilitation grant to
study for the ministry at a religious school for the blind. 149 Basing its ruling on
federal law, the Washington Supreme Court held that using the funds at a
religious school would violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.) ° The U.S. Supreme Court reversed this decision, rejecting the
contention that state vocational rehabilitation aid used at a religious school would
advance religion and thus be prohibited under the Establishment Clause."1

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

2.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
Viteritti, supra n. 71, at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Viteritti, supra n. 71, at 150.
Viteritti, supra n. 26, at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
474 U.S. at 489.
Id. at 483.
Witters v. Washington Commn. for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53 (1984).
Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
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However, the Court hinted that Washington could reconsider the case under its
own state constitution,152 and that is precisely what the Supreme Court of
Washington did. Citing its own constitution's strict establishment clause language,
on remand the state court again denied Witter the funds. 5 3 The U.S. Supreme
Court declined to review Witters 111.154
F.

State Blaine Amendments

The Washington Constitution contains language, similar to language in many
state constitutions, prohibiting any state funding of religious instruction.'55 These
prohibitions have been used to support state court decisions holding that vouchers
used by a student in a religious school violate the state interest in separation of
church and state, regardless of United States Supreme Court analysis to the
contrary.156 Opponents of these state constitutional provisions, usually referred to
as "Blaine amendments," point to the history of such amendments, claiming they
are rooted in anti-Catholic bigotry.'57
In 1875, James G. Blaine, Speaker of the House from 1869 to 1875, proposed
several forms of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would have
prohibited religious schools from receiving any state tax money. 5 The impetus

152. Id. at 489.
153. Witters v. Washington Commn. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1989).
154. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
155. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
156. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and State
ConstitutionalLaw, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 657, 659 (1998). Viteritti contends that:
At present the most severe battles taking place with regard to the issue of school choice are
occurring in the state courts. Opponents of choice are planning their legal strategies around
the existence of ... provisions incorporated into many state constitutions; these provisions
set more rigid standards of separation between church and state than those required by the
Supreme Court in its interpretation of the First Amendment.
Id.
157. For a detailed history of the Blaine Amendment and subsequent amendments aimed not only at
Catholics but Protestants as welt, see Hamburger, supra n. 49, at ch. 11. Blaine's original amendment,
proposed to the United States Congress in 1875, read:
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall
ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so
devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
Id. at 297-298.
158. Id. Those proposing an amendment to the United States Constitution did so because of their
belief that the Constitution did not adequately provide for separation of church and state. Id. at 296.
In the beginning they argued for a revised First Amendment. This was originally instigated by a
unified effort of Unitarians, the National Liberal League, and supported by such as William Lloyd
Garrison and Charles Darwin. Id. at 288-89. Their pursuit of the amendment stemmed from the
urging of a newspaper called the Index, which was published by the Free Religious Association.
Hanburger,supra n. 49, at 288-96. For two years, starting at the beginning of 1874, the Index printed its
favored version of a constitutional amendment. It read:
SECTION 1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
favoring any particular form of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol40/iss2/8

18

Hudson: From Everson to Davey: The Road Is Long, with Many a Winding Turn
2004]

FROM EVERSON TO DAVEY

for the proposed amendments, which were repeatedly defeated, was a perceived
Catholic threat to the pervasive Protestantism in public schools, and a
disinclination to fund Catholic schools. 5 9

Catholics in large urban areas had begun to use the political process to get
their state legislatures to provide public funds so that they could escape the

predominantly Protestant public schools.' 6° In other cases, Catholics pressured
local school districts to prohibit Bible readings and other religious exercises that

were against Catholic teachings.'6 In response, pressure from Protestant churches
and to preserve the Protestant
and nativist groups to stop aid to sectarian schools
162
character of the public schools began to mount.

President Ulysses S. Grant responded by proposing an amendment that
would have ensured that no public money would support institutions that were

religious. 63 Blaine, hoping to receive the nomination from the Republican Party
to succeed Grant, offered to sponsor such an amendment.' 64 Blaine's amendment
was defeated by four votes in the Senate. 165 However, its principles became a part
of the Republican Party's political platform and continued to affect public

discourse concerning state funding for religious education. 166 When states like
Washington sought admission into the Union, they were required by a Republican
dominated Congress to have such amendments in their constitutions in order to
receive congressional approval for admittance. 67

Consequently, there were

reportedly twenty-nine states that had Blaine amendments in their constitutions
by 1890.168 Washington's constitution was alleged to contain such an amendment.
IV.

LOCKE V. DAVEY

There was a great deal of anticipation leading up to the Court's decision on
whether the denial of Joshua Davey's scholarship-solely on the basis of his major
in devotional theology-was a violation of his constitutional rights. 169 Many saw

SECTION 2. No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
favoring any particular form of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... No
religious test shall ever be required as a condition of suffrage ....
Id. at 296. See generally Richard G. Bacon, Rum, Romanism and Romer: Equal Protection and the
Blaine Amendment in State Constitutions, 6 Del. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (particularly reviewing the Blaine
Amendment's effects on education in Delaware); Brandi Richardson, Student Author, Eradicating
Blaine's Legacy of Hate: Removing the Barrierto State Funding of Religious Education, 52 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 1041 (2003); Viteritti, supra n. 71; Viteritti, supra n. 156.
159. Viteritti, supra n. 156, at 669.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 670.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Viteritti, supra n. 156, at 670.
165. Id. at 672. It is noteworthy that if Congress, in 1865, had interpreted the First Amendment to
demand a separation of church and state, there would have been no need for an amendment
prohibiting the funding of religious schools.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 672-73.
168. Id. at 673.
169. Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
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the case as one more battle in the ongoing "culture wars. 1 70 When the decision
came, the Court's ruling that Washington was within
constitutional bounds to
1 71
deny Davey his scholarship was a surprise to most.
Washington established the Promise Scholarship in 1999 in order to help
academically talented young graduates that might not otherwise be able to afford
to attend college. 72 The state legislature provided the scholarship to eligible
17
students for postsecondary education-related expenses, renewable for one year. 1
The amount of the scholarship was to vary each year according to the amount
appropriated
in the general fund, and was to be prorated among the eligible
174
students.
There were three areas of eligibility requirements for the scholarship:
academics, income, and enrollment.175 The candidate must graduate in the top
fifteen percent of the class from one of Washington's private or public high
schools or receive at least a 1,200 SAT or 27 ACT on the first attempt. 76 The
candidate must also demonstrate family income less than 135 percent of the
State's median income. 177 Finally, a candidate must enroll "at least half-time in an
eligible postsecondary institution in the state of Washington.' 7 8 The only caveat,
and the source of Davey's
complaint, was that the student must not have a major
179
in devotional theology.
The Washington statute specifically provides that an eligible student is one
who "is not pursuing a degree in theology."' 8° The intent of the statute was to be
in compliance with the state's constitutional provision that prohibits any funding
for the promotion of religion.' 8' The relevant clause of the Washington
Constitution states: "No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious8 worship,
exercise or instruction, or the support of any
2
1
establishment.'
religious

170. See Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Backs Withholding Public Scholarships for Theology,
243 Wall St. J. A4, A4 (Feb. 26, 2004) ("In a defeat for social conservatives, the Supreme Court upheld
Washington state's right to withhold publicly funded scholarships from students pursuing theology
degrees. The 7-2 decision involving the Constitution's separation of church and state comes as other
issues in the so-called culture wars are heating up .... ").
171. Professors Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Co-Directors of Legal Research, Roundtable on Religion
and Social Welfare Policy, Analysis: Locke v. Davey, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal
_update-display.cfm?id=23 ("When, on February 25, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Locke v. Davey, the timing took many people by surprise; most expected that the decision would come
closer to the end of the Court's Term in June. The result in Davey, however, proved to be a far greater
surprise.").
172. Davey, 540 U.S. at 715-16.
173. Id. at 716.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Davey, 540 U.S. at 716.
178. Id. (quoting Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(f) (2003)).
179. Id.
180. Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(g) (2003).
181. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
182. Id.
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After receiving the scholarship, Davey received a letter from the governor,
congratulating him on his selection as a Washington Promise Scholarship
recipient, and stating that "[e]ducation is the great equalizer in our society.
Regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or income, a quality education places all of
us on a more level playing field." 183
Davey enrolled in the fall of 1999 at Northwest College, a private religious
school affiliated with the Assemblies of God denomination, and declared a double
14
major in Pastoral Ministries and Business Management and Administration.
Davey then learned from the school's financial aid office that because of his major
85
in theology, he would be disqualified from receiving his Promise Scholarship.
The Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board ("HECB") had sent
student
notices to all postsecondary financial.aid offices informing them that any
186
pursuing a degree in theology would not be eligible for the scholarship.
Apparently the governor's stated purpose, as explained in his letter to
Davey, of putting everyone on a level playing field, regardless of his or her gender,
race, ethnicity or income, did not include diversity of vocation if the chosen
vocation was religious. Davey, after having been selected due to his academic
performance and financial need, was then prohibited 187from receiving the
scholarship solely because of his career choice to be a pastor.
Davey filed suit in the District Court for the Western District of Washington,
seeking an injunction against the state requiring the reinstatement of his
scholarship.1 88 He initially brought claims under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as Article 1, §§ 5 and 11 of the
Washington Constitution. 9 The district court rejected all of Davey's claims and
granted summary judgment in favor of Washington'l The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed,' 9' relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Lukumi,
providing that any government program that is not facially neutral to religion is
presumptively unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that the relevant section
of the Promise Scholarship statute singled out theology on its face.' 92 Further, it
held that the denial of a scholarship to a student otherwise qualified under the
state's objective criteria, solely because he is pursuing a degree in theology,

183. Petr. Br. at 8-9, Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Petr.Br.].
184. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
185. Id.
186. Petr. Br., supra n. 183, at 10.
187. Id. at 2, 11,23.
188. Davey v. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
189. Petr.Br., supra n. 183, at 5.
190. Davey, 540 U.S. at 718. The district court relied primarily on Witters v. State Commn. for the
Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22273 at *9.
191. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (2002).
192. Id. at 752.
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"infringes his right to the free exercise of his religion."1' 93 Washington appealed
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 194
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Locke v. Davey, both sides knew
the stakes were high and the potential ramifications were far reaching. If the
Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the relevant section of the
Washington Constitution was unconstitutional, similar provisions in dozens of
state constitutions might be invalidated.195 Just three months before the Court
decided Davey, the Wall Street Journal opined that "all sides understand that
what's really at stake [in Davey] is the future of the so-called 'Blaine Amendment'
in the Washington constitution that provides the legal rationale for this
discrimination."' 96 In reference to a previous quote from Justice Thomas that
these types of provisions were "born of bigotry" and "should be buried now," the
Journalwent on to say that "Davey gives the Supreme Court the chance to do just
that." 97
However, those hoping for such a burial were to be disappointed. Instead,
the Court in Davey declined to specifically deal with the constitutionality of the
severely strict establishment clause in Washington's constitution, or even to apply
any of its usual tests to the Promise Scholarship provisions that singled out Davey
for exclusion.198 In a surprisingly brief analysis, the court rejected all of Davey's
constitutional claims. 99 The strong language in Lukumi had clearly declared that
the minimum requirement for constitutionality was that a statute not discriminate
on its face.2 ° Washington's Promise Scholarship statute was not neutral on its
face.201 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said that the
court must reject the claim that it should employ the Lukumi test of facial
neutrality. 202 If it applied Lukumi, said Rehnquist, it would "extend that line of
cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning."20' 3 Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Thomas, heartily disagreed in his dissent, arguing that the Court's
sustains a
opinion in Lukumi was "irreconcilable with today's decision, which
24
public benefits program that facially discriminates against religion."
The Court also failed to address concerns that the relevant Washington
constitutional provisions were products of the so-called Blaine Amendment. The
brief presented to the Ninth Circuit on behalf of Davey had claimed that the
foundational basis for the Washington Constitution's strict establishment clause

193.
194.
195.
Blaine
196.

Id. at 760.
Locke v. Davey, 538 U.S. 1031 (2003).
Viteritti, supra n. 156, at 673 (stating that there were twenty-nine state constitutions that had
amendments by the end of the nineteenth-century).
Editorial, The Blaine Game, 242 Wall St. J. A18 (Dec. 2, 2003).

197. Id.
198. Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
199.
200.
201.
202

Id. at 725.
508 U.S. at 533-34.
Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(g).
Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.

203. Id.
204. Id. at 726.
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was historical anti-Catholic bigotry.2°5 However, the Court alluded to these claims
only in footnote seven of its opinion, which briefly mentioned the concerns that
had been raised.
It dismissed the contention that the denial of Davey's
scholarship was based on a Blaine amendment by saying that neither the amicus
briefs nor Davey had "established a credible connection between the Blaine
Amendment and . . . the relevant constitutional provision. ''206 Chief Justice
Rehnquist
went on to say, "the Blaine Amendment's history is simply not before
207
US."

Hopes that the Court would use Davey to define the limits of the states'
ability to chart their own course were dashed. Since funding is permitted
according to Zelman, Mitchell, Agostini, Zobrest, Bowen, and Witters, and since
discrimination is forbidden according to McDaniel, Mergens, Lambs Chapel,
Rosenberger, and particularly Lukumi, it seemed likely the Court would find that
Davey's constitutional rights had been violated. The Court was also, however,
weighing the competing principle of federalism against incorporation. In the end,
the Court leaned toward federalism, leaving states to analyze their own
establishment clauses, and thus leaving incorporation incomprehensible. The
Court should have clearly addressed how the First Amendment's application to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment changed the states' right to
regulate religion. With federalism and incorporation at issue, the question Davey
ultimately posed to the Court was: Do the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, the protective promises of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
and public policy dictate that state constitutions should not be allowed to single
out individuals for discrimination on the basis of religion? If the answer to this
question is yes, Davey was wrongly decided, and Blaine amendments should have
been, and still should be, ruled unconstitutional.
V.

LOCKE V. DAVEY: FAULTY RATIONALE

In finding the terms of the Promise Scholarship constitutional, the Court
reasoned that although Washington could fund Davey's scholarship and not be in
violation of the U.S. Constitution, it was not required to do so. "In other words,"
according to the Court, "there are some state actions permitted by the
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.' 0 8 Chief
Justice Rehnquist described this area between the two parts of the Religion
Clause as "room for play in the joints," 2°9 but did not define how spacious this
joint might be.
205. Petr. Br., supra n. 183, at 29-30.
206. Davey, 540 U.S. at 724 n. 7.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 718-19.
209. Id. at 718 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 669). It is interesting that the context of the quote from
Walz actually speaks to the requirement of neutrality, not the right of the state to discriminate against
religion. It states:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the
Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
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Instead, the Court simply concluded that Washington's interest in upholding
its constitution outweighed Davey's burden of not receiving the scholarship.1 0
The Court's holding that the state's interest was of greater weight than Davey's
burden was one of the more baffling parts of the analysis. Justice Rehnquist
dismissed Davey's burden as if he were swatting at a fly, saying only that "[t]he
State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and
the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise
Scholars., 211 Davey's scholarship for two years would have been approximately
$2,700.212 It was undisputed that Davey had financial needs-after all, establishing
a financial need was one of the criteria for receiving the scholarship. 213 Davey left
for college the proud recipient of an honored scholarship, only to be faced with
the notoriety and disappointment of being singled out for discrimination and
made ineligible unless he changed his major. In his dissent Justice Scalia argued
that:
Even if there were some threshold quantum-of-harm requirement, surely Davey
has satisfied it. The First Amendment, after all, guarantees free exercise of religion,
and when the State exacts a financial penalty of almost $3000 for religious
exercise-whether by tax or by forfeiture
of an otherwise available benefit214
religious practice is anything but free.
One of the most often applied prongs of the Lemon test requires that a law
not excessively entangle the government with religion. 2" Applying this prong of
the Lemon test to Davey, one might conclude that Washington "actually paid
students not to major in theology." 1 6 In addition, testimony of the administrator
of the scholarship at Northwest College attested to the fact that many students
faced with the dilemma of losing their scholarship consider changing their
majors.1 7 This is a daunting decision to place before a college freshman.
Dangling a carrot that forces an individual to choose between a generally
applicable public benefit and a religious practice is arguably the type of
government entanglement with religion that the Court has consistently disallowed.
The Court's attempt to distinguish Lukumi is not persuasive. In Lukumi, the
Court made strong statements about religious discrimination, prohibiting states

governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental
acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
The Promise Scholarship's restriction does not appear to meet any of these standards: it is
interfering with religion and it is not exhibiting "benevolent neutrality." The argument cannot be
made that it is establishing religion, because the Supreme Court has said that when individual choice
breaks the funding chain there is no establishment of religion. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
210. Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 716.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 731 (emphasis in original).
215. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
216. Laycock, supra n. 31, at 160 (emphasis omitted).
217. Jt. App. at 62-64, Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
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from "disapprov[ing] of a particular religion or of religion in general. 2, 8 The
Court also stated in Lukumi that "[t]he principle that government may not enact
laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few
violations are recorded in our opinions., 21 9 It is hard to understand how the Court
felt that Davey's choice of a major in theology did not fall into the category of a
religious practice. In determining that the state's withdrawal of Davey's
scholarship did not prevent him from practicing his religion, the Court
undermined its argument in Lukumi. The Santerias, based on the Court's
rationale in Davey, could have practiced their religion under the disputed statute,
as long as they did not sacrifice animals. Here, according to Justice Rehnquist,
Davey can practice his religion, he just cannot practice it by being a minister and
still keep his scholarship. It is difficult to see the difference. The Court had
emphasized in Lukumi that a "law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral ... must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny"2 and that "the minimum

requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. 22 1 In the
Lukumi concurrence, two justices said that when a law "discriminates against
religion as such,. . . it automatically will fail strict scrutiny., 222 These seemed like
strong, unambiguous guidelines.
The Court distinguished Davey from Lukumi, however, saying that in Davey
the state's "disfavor of religion.., is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither
criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite., 223 Yet Lukumi
clearly stated that no discrimination was allowed, however mild.
The Court characterized the Promise Scholarship as going out of its way to
accommodate religion by allowing students receiving the scholarship to attend
pervasively Christian colleges.224 This argument is weak on two counts. First, the
First Amendment is not about protection of "religion." It is about protecting
individuals in the free exercise of their religion. The law at issue here
discriminates against Davey, an individual. Second, in allowing students to use
the scholarship at Christian colleges the state belies the interest it claims to serve
in revoking Davey's scholarship. Its interest was stated to be ensuring that the
Promise Scholarship conforms to the state constitution, which prohibits state
money being "applied to any religious... instruction. ' '225 Allowing money to go
to pervasively Christian colleges and yet not to theology majors makes
discrimination against Davey seem arbitrary.
The ramifications of Davey may be far-reaching. Those who are interested
in seeing Blaine amendments eradicated are primarily interested in those

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

508 U.S. at 532.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 579.
Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
Id. at 724-25.
Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
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amendments' effect on school vouchers.126 Those who are proponents of vouchers
view them as the chief hope for bringing the American education system out of its
current crisis. 7 Unless Davey can somehow be narrowly distinguished, states will
use laws based on their own establishment clauses to prevent legislation that
promotes a market-based approach to education, particularly when it
encompasses vouchers that can be used in religious schools.
As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, Davey carried to its logical
extreme could make other public benefits, ones that might indirectly go to
someone studying for the ministry, eligible to be withheld. Although it is hard to
imagine this scenario happening, the principle enunciated in Davey would allow
for it. A person receiving disability, welfare, or unemployment benefits that
decided to study for the ministry could foreseeably be barred from receiving his or
her benefit.228
V.

CONCLUSION

Everson v. Board of Education started the Court and the country down a
long winding road toward a destination that is still unclear. Religion continues to
be an important part of the lives of a majority of Americans. Yet America has
also become a multi-cultural society with innumerable religions. The government
has a duty to protect the believer and the non-believer alike from coercion in
Yet the Court must observe that the First
favor of or against religion.
Amendment puts religion on a special pedestal and considers it important. Not
only has the Constitution given it special prominence, but religion has also figured
largely in the warp and woof of the republic since its inception. 229 It is crucial that
the government find the precarious balance needed to make good on the
Founders' promises. As one author has noted:
There is nothing more repugnant to the notion of civil liberty than to use the
religion clauses of the First Amendment as an instrument to discriminate against
institutions or individuals on the basis of their religious affiliation. But the
application of state constitutional
standards to achieve the same effect is no less
2 30
offensive to religious rights.
If the Supreme Court continues to allow state governments to exercise the
power to discriminate against religious conduct, "the Court has quite possibly
come to the worst solution for religious liberty. '' 3' The Court left open the
possibility that it would consider whether Blaine amendments are constitutional
when it declared in Davey that "the Blaine Amendment's history is simply not

226. See generally Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and Its Effects on
Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1105 (2003).
227. Id. at 1170-75.
228. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. See generally Lib. Cong., supra n. 69.
230. Viteritti, supra n. 26, at 336 (footnote omitted).
231. Laycock, supra n. 31, at 161.
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before us.''232 If and when the Blaine amendments are before the Court, the Court
should simplify First Amendment jurisprudence by primarily considering the
effect its decision will have on maximizing religious liberty and promoting a
healthy pluralism. Sufficient time has been spent trying to build a wall, and it has
not resulted in good law. Any Supreme Court decision should "minimize the
effect it has on the voluntary, independent religious decisions of the people as
individuals and in voluntary groups., 233 That is why the neutrality standard
is compelling. It offers "indisputable
applied to either half of the religion clause
234
fair.,
"eminently
is
and
reasonability"
The Court's decision in Davey seems to indicate that, in spite of Lukumi's
dictates to the contrary, state statutes may facially discriminate against religionat least when funding is at issue. This is "remarkable, 235 in light of the fact that it
had never before allowed such straightforward discrimination. 36 Unfortunately,
Davey adds not only another new book to the library about what the Court has
decided the First Amendment means, but also a few volumes about what it should
mean. The long and winding road just took a detour!
CarolA. Hudson**

232. 540 U.S. at 724 n. 7.
233. Laycock, supra n. 31, at 160-61 n. 26 (quoting Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories,
72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693,703-04 (1997)).
234. Viteritti, supra n. 26, at 335.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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